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ABSTRACT
This article examines voluntariness in migration decisions by
promoting the acknowledgement of forced and voluntary
migration as a continuum of experience, not a dichotomy. Studies
on conflict-related migration and migration, in general, remain
poorly connected, despite calls for interaction. This reflects the
forced–voluntary dichotomy’s stickiness within and beyond
academia, which is closely connected to the political implications
of unsettling it and potentially undermining migrants’ protection
rights. We delve into notions of the ‘voluntariness’ of migration
and argue for the analytical need to relate evaluations of
voluntariness to available alternatives. Drawing on qualitative
research with people from Afghanistan and Pakistan coming to
Europe, we hone in on three particular renderings of migration:
migrants’ own experiences, scholarly qualitative observations and
labelling by immigration authorities. Analysing migration as stages
in a process: leaving – journey (and transit) – arrival and
settlement – return or onward migration, we highlight the specific
effects of migration being described as being forced or voluntary.
Labelling as ‘forced’ (or not) matters to migrants and states when
asylum status is on the line. For migration scholars, it remains
challenging to decouple these descriptions from state systems of
migration management; though doing so enhances our
understanding of the role voluntariness plays in migration decisions.
KEYWORDS
Migrants; refugees; forced;
voluntary; drivers of
migration
Introduction
Migration studies often utilises oppositional typologies to categorise different groups and
experiences: skilled-unskilled; temporary-permanent; and, key to this article, forced–
voluntary. However, the blurring of boundaries between categories is also regularly
acknowledged, and most scholars prefer to think of such dichotomies as a spectrum of
experiences (see Castles, De Haas, and Miller 2014; Fussell 2012; Richmond 1993).
Regarding the forced–voluntary distinction, whilst there may be identifiable extreme
cases, most migrants’ experiences of the degree of volition in their migration decisions
means they fall somewhere in the blurry middle of the forced–voluntary spectrum.
Even a cursory review of migrant experiences shows overlaps between migrants who
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are labelled as ‘forced’ or ‘voluntary’. Fieldwork observations convince us of the impossi-
bility of describing someone’s decision to migrate as entirely voluntary or entirely forced.
Making a clear-cut distinction between forced and voluntary migration is not acceptable
from an empirical, and consequently, analytical, point of view, even if labelling for the sake
of migration management upholds the notion (see also Carling 2017; Crawley and Skle-
paris 2017).
However, is it enough to point out the complexity and highlight the spectrum of experi-
ences, before moving on? Can migration studies grapple with the drivers of migration and
their connection to aspirations and desires (Carling and Collins 2017) without addressing
the volition involved in migration? Whilst our fieldwork observations rightly encourage us
to emphasise complexity, we, as migrations scholars, cannot – and should not – simply
leave the discussion there. Because the distinction between forced and voluntary, as two
very different forms of migration, has a tendency to stick around in academic work and
policy, migration scholars must unpack the experienced, observed and labelled dimensions
of this distinction. And we can do so by examining differing analytical and discursive
constructions.
Firstly, if we as academics emphasise the ‘mixed’ nature of all migration, then what are
the implications for those with particular protection needs and those with the right to
refugee status under the 1951 Refugee Convention (Kumin 2014; Van Hear, Brubaker,
and Bessa 2009; Van Heelsum 2016)? Secondly, migration management, as practised by
many European countries, requires labelling migrants as forced or voluntary to sort
them into bureaucratic categories such as asylum seeker, refugee, labour migrant, family
reunification migrant and international student, amongst others; where the first two cat-
egories are seen as forced migrants and the latter three are seen as voluntary migrants.
Even if the particular terminology of forced and voluntary is not necessarily used in
public discussions of migration, the academic categories of forced and voluntary can be
mapped onto public categories of refugee/asylum seeker and economic migrant, respect-
ively, at least in Europe. Bureaucratic distinctions and labels have discursive power, and
the labelling of individuals as forced or voluntary impacts their migratory experiences.
We argue that it is not enough to simply point out that the distinction between forced
and voluntary migration is complex. We propose that whilst migration scholars need to
keep acknowledging the complexity of the degree and type of volition involved in
migration decisions, we also need to further unpack the forced–voluntary spectrum.
Our focus is thus on migration decisions, honing in on the question of when someone
– in their own experience, via scholarly observations or through an immigration authority
label – might be described as having been ‘forced to leave’, and how this matters analyti-
cally and discursively.
Our hope is to advance analytical discussion of voluntariness, choice and alternatives,
whilst also seeking to tackle the stickiness of the forced–voluntary migration dichotomy
from an analytical angle. Undertaking this is no simple task, and we aspire to encourage
discussion, rather than to provide answers. Addressing the distinctions and similarities
between forced and voluntary migration is fraught with dilemma. Unsettling the
common understanding of a clear-cut ‘forced migrant’ may contribute to undermining
the international refugee regime. However, it has also been argued that a presumed
binary between forced and voluntary migrants has been instrumental in creating the
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figure of the ‘illegal migrant’ and ‘bogus asylum seeker’ – those not deserving of inter-
national protection (Casas-Cortes et al. 2015).
This article is positioned as a discussion piece with applications beyond any one
migration context. That said, it is shaped by our longstanding ethnographic engagements
with two migrant groups: one usually labelled as forced (Afghans) and one generally
labelled as voluntary (Pakistanis). It is also shaped by the time of writing, as the 2015–
2016 European ‘crisis’ over refugees and migration was unfolding. We start by investi-
gating the effect of labelling and how labels can have discursive significance. We then
discuss some of the ways the concept of volition has been addressed by scholars of
migration and other disciplines. This is followed by a brief overview of Afghan and Pakis-
tani migration, setting the stage to examine how voluntariness, choice and alternatives in
migration decisions are experienced by migrants, observed by scholars and labelled by
immigration authorities, as well as how they intersect and what their implications are.
The significance of labelling migration
Writing about conceptualising migration and displacement, Bakewell (2011) makes a
strong case for unpicking the usage of ‘migration’ and ‘displacement’ as terms to describe
a process, a condition and a category. This means that a migrant might be someone who is
doing migration, who is being a migrant or someone who is being described as a migrant.
Moreover, different actors may use the term ‘migration’ (or ‘displacement’) in these differ-
ent ways without considering the implications of the different usages (2011).
Building on Bakewell’s (2011) suggestions, we use analytical and discursive significance
as a way to differentiate the implications of labelling migration as forced or voluntary. Fol-
lowing Foucault (1972 inter alia), discourse represents a way of thinking, which then has a
significant effect on the social construction of ‘reality’ (e.g. through language). Crucially,
discourse also checks the realms of possibility, what is and is not seen as acceptable (Butler
1997). In migration and refugee studies, the discourse and ‘labels’ (Zetter 1991, 2007) to
describe migrants sway the selection of responses – which are ‘acceptable’ and which are
even possible – to those migrants. Whether someone is discursively presented as an econ-
omic migrant or a refugee, for instance, majorly influences their treatment by immigration
authorities and humanitarian actors. As Zetter (2007, 173) notes, labelling people as ‘refu-
gees’ not only serves a descriptive purpose, but can also explain ‘the complex and often
disjunctive impacts of humanitarian intervention’. In other words, a key part of the dis-
cursive significance of identifying people as refugees, vis-à-vis other migrant categories,
is how they will be treated.
If we accept the discursive (and normative, see Ottonelli and Torresi 2013) power of
labelling someone as a forced or voluntary migrant, then we should also question those
descriptions, especially being written, as they are, by powerful governments and inter-
national institutions. Are they accurate? Are they appropriate? As migration scholars,
we should not just accept the discourses handed to us, but also recognise our own roles
in creating, influencing and maintaining or disrupting them. In addition, we should ques-
tion whether a discourse represents ‘reality’ as we see it through fieldwork observations
and other research interactions. It is here that we get insight into migrants’ experiences
and their own interpretations of experiences, which are inevitably produced through
migrants’ execution of their agency in relation to prevailing constraints.
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In referring to discursive and analytical significance, these are the dimensions we
examine, including, on the one hand, the labelling of individuals into bureaucratic cat-
egories. On the other hand, there are the observed and experienced realities that are ana-
lytically produced through data collection and analysis. Encompassing migrants’
lifeworlds and the role of agency, these dimensions necessarily become nuanced and
complicated.
We acknowledge that by focusing on the forced–voluntary continuum, we run the risk
of reifying extremes. To avoid doing so, we take a critical approach that questions not
simply ‘causes’, but also responses, as they are mediated through migrants’ agency and,
in turn, do or do not trigger states’ duties to protect individuals according to international
obligations. The role of agency is crucial, as virtually no migration happens without a great
deal of it in place. Nevertheless, migrant agency is often seen as suspect by restrictive
immigration regimes, such as those seeking to control migration from Africa, the
Middle East and Asia to Europe as well as from South America to North America. Follow-
ing De Genova (2016), those labelled as refugees may be pitied as ‘victims’ of forced dis-
placement whilst they reside in camps in neighbouring countries; yet, as soon as they show
more ‘entrepreneurial’ agency by choosing to leave the camp and head farther afield, they
become suspect, labelled as ‘illegal migrants’ or ‘bogus asylum seekers’, reflecting the dis-
cursive power of migrant labels and categories.
Despite their thematic dovetails, studies on conflict-related migration and migration, in
general, remain poorly connected. Within the sub-discipline of forced migration studies,
discussions about description – whether as forced migration studies, refugee studies or the
study of conflict-related migration, war-time migration and war mobilities (see Harpviken
2009; Hathaway 2007; Lindley 2010; Lubkemann 2008a, 2008b) – reflect the definitional
challenges of pinning down ‘forced’ migration as something analytically distinctive from
‘voluntary’ migration. What may be pinned down, though, is the usual context of violent
conflict, which frequently proxies for a specification of which contexts are associated with
forced migration and which are not. This has also been critiqued by scholars of such con-
texts, for example, Liberia (Lubkemann 2008a).
The literature in both migration studies and forced migration studies is somewhat
limited in its analysis of the implications of volition on migration processes, despite
forced–voluntary being a key dichotomy in typologies of migration (notable exceptions
include Fussell 2012; Ottonelli and Torresi 2013). In forced migration studies, much of
this debate has concerned the implications of expanding ‘refugee studies’ as a field focus-
ing on those outside their country of origin due to a well-founded fear of persecution (as
defined by the 1951 Refugee Convention), to ‘forced migration studies’ as a field that
incorporates a much more diverse range of displaced people.1 This has led to interesting
discussions about the term ‘forced’, but the focus has been on the difference between being
‘forced’ by political factors recognisable under the 1951 Refugee Convention versus other
factors (e.g. economic or environmental), and whether forced migration necessitates
crossing an international border, or includes internal displacement.
Meanwhile, in mainstream migration studies, theorising around why people migrate
has largely focussed on migrants assumed to be migrating voluntarily, rather than
looking at the forced–voluntary spectrum as a whole. However, there is also an emerging
limited body of work bringing to attention the counterpart to forced migration, namely
4 M. B. ERDAL AND C. OEPPEN
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‘involuntary immobility’, where volition is a key concern (Carling 2002; Jónsson 2008;
Lubkemann 2008b).
The difficulty in pinpointing whether someone’s migration was entirely voluntary or
entirely involuntary has led to a small, but compelling body of literature, which explores
volition in more depth (see e.g. Bartram 2015; Long 2013; Ottonelli and Torresi 2013). In
the following section, we draw on these studies as well as some non-migration research on
the concept of voluntariness (see Colburn 2008; Olsaretti 2004) to examine current aca-
demic understandings of volition.
The role of volition in migration decisions and processes
‘Voluntary’ – meaning acted by choice, with free will and without compulsion – is a term
regularly used to refer to migration types. However, there is a range of ways to understand
it. Do we understand voluntary in terms of a totally free choice from a range of options? Or
do we understand it as choosing the least worst choice from a limited or virtually non-
existent range of options?
Whilst acknowledging that some people may migrate out of the ‘joy’ of mobility, for
adventure and to see the world, the majority choose to migrate because they believe
that physically moving to another place will lead to improvement in their and/or their
family’s living situation. ‘Improvement’ may take diverse forms (a better job, being
closer to family, escaping a war zone, more pleasant weather, etc.). Consequently, a start-
ing point for understanding volition in migration is the range and quality of alternatives
available to potential migrants if they just stay where they are. In other words, to what
extent will they be able to enjoy a reasonable quality of life without migrating? We
might consider the migration less voluntary when the answer is ‘not at all’ rather than
‘to some extent’. The perception of suitable options and necessity of alternatives – and
the notion of a ‘reasonable quality of life’ – are subjective. Still, it is the premise of
much conceptual literature, some of which we examine here, exploring voluntariness
outside of migration studies.
For example, if we take a worker in a ‘3D’ (dirty, dangerous and demeaning) job, we
could argue that as long as they are not a slave then they are doing that job voluntarily.
In neoclassical economics, a worker voluntarily gives labour in exchange for income
because the alternative – no income – is worse. But is this acceptable? Is it enough to
say that a worker in a 3D job is doing that work voluntarily because they are not enslaved,
when the alternative to doing that job is perhaps destitution? For the libertarian philoso-
pher Nozick (1974), voluntariness depends on non-infringement of rights. His case is that
if another individual or the state’s actions infringe on a person’s rights, then we can con-
sider their consequent choices coerced, rather than voluntary. Taking this approach, it is
clear that the observer’s view on what constitutes ‘rights’will have an important bearing on
whether they view actions to be coerced or voluntary.
To return to the example of the 3D worker, if we consider it the right of that worker to
receive an income (for example in the form of welfare payments) by the state if they are
unable to find acceptable non-demeaning work, then a lack of that alternative income
might lead us to conclude that they were coerced into do that 3D job. This is a very differ-
ent stance from Nozick (1974) whose view of rights minimised them to rights to life,
liberty and property, and whose work suggests that he would have taken a dim view of
JOURNAL OF ETHNIC AND MIGRATION STUDIES 5
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the state taking such an expansive role as to provide welfare assistance (Kymlicka 2002). If
we apply Nozick’s (1974) understanding of voluntariness to migration, and if the potential
migrant’s rights to life, liberty and property were being infringed, then their migration
would be non-voluntary. A case in point would involve the archetypal ‘convention
refugee’, for example, an intellectual forced to leave Afghanistan in the late 1970s
because the alternative was being imprisoned by the Communist government for their pol-
itical views. This scenario does not portray a migrant leaving because they cannot find
employment and, according to Nozick, they have no right to expect an external actor to
provide employment in their current place of residence. The migration would thus be
voluntary, even if the alternative was destitution, because the choice was made ‘freely’.2
Like Long (2013, 160), we see Olsaretti’s (1998, 2004) more expansive view of voluntari-
ness as an improvement on Nozick’s minimalist approach to rights. Whereas Nozick holds
that someone who is ‘free’ (i.e. their rights to life, liberty and property are not being threa-
tened) means their choices are voluntary, Olsaretti (1998) argues that freedom and volun-
tariness do not necessarily map onto each other. She illustrates this point through
comparative examples, which we adapt here using migration-relevant scenarios.
Example 1: Amira is an inhabitant of Syria, which she is free to leave. However, although she
wants to leave, Amira knows that if she leaves she will not survive the hardship of the journey
out of the country and she will die. Her choice to remain in Syria is not a voluntary one.
Example 2: Bisrat is a national service conscript in Eritrea, meaning he is not free to leave the
country. However, Eritrea has all Bisrat feels he needs and he does not want to leave, so he
remains voluntarily. (after Olsaretti 1998, 71)
Olsaretti (1998) posits that a choice is voluntary when it is made in the context of accep-
table alternatives or if the lack itself of alternatives is acceptable to the person making the
choice. Bisrat does not make a choice based on a lack of alternatives because he is not con-
cerned with the lack of alternatives; he is content with the alternatives he has – this deter-
mines whether or not his choice is voluntary. The above scenarios illustrate how freedom,
the presence of acceptable alternatives and voluntariness do not necessarily coincide.
Amira is free but staying involuntarily; Bisrat is not free but staying voluntarily. Both
Nozick and Olsaretti take a philosophical approach to volition, aiming to demonstrate
that a choice is either voluntary or involuntary. This contrasts to empirical research by
migration scholars, which reinforces the difficulties in drawing such sharp distinctions.
However, Olsaretti’s (2004) argument – that choices must be made not only freely, but
also in the context of acceptable alternatives – has been echoed by migration scholars
(see Bartram 2015; Ottonelli and Torresi 2013).
To Olsaretti’s work, Colburn (2008) makes an important addition: that the perception
of acceptable alternatives is shaped by a person’s beliefs and access to information. Accep-
table alternatives are instrumental to whether a choice is voluntary or not (Bartram 2015).
Migrants themselves, immigration authorities, migrant rights’ activists (and other civil
society, non-governmental organisations and UNHCR) also each have ideas of what is
acceptable, as illustrated by the international refugee regime. The disjuncture between
what is and is not acceptable is starkly illustrated by refugee status determination decisions
that posit internal relocation to ‘safe areas’ as an acceptable alternative to asylum, thereby
enabling the removal of rejected asylum seekers to insecure countries, such as Afghanistan.
6 M. B. ERDAL AND C. OEPPEN
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This is the basic premise of Bartram’s (2015) article, which points out that themajority of
refugees are not physically forced to leave. Rather, finds Bartram, certain implications of
staying (for example, being forced to change religion or being made a political prisoner)
are recognised as an affront to human dignity and as unacceptable alternatives to fleeing,
whereas other implications (for example, extreme poverty) are not seen in the same way.
Thus, volition in relation to migration decisions is closely tied to available acceptable
alternatives and the agency to act on those options.Whether someone’smigration is labelled
as voluntary or not, however, depends on the labellers’ perception of what constitutes
‘acceptable’ alternatives. Ottonelli and Torresi’s (2013) and Bartram’s (2015) proposition
of voluntariness results in many more of the worlds’ migrants – international and internal
– falling in the non-voluntary bracket than the 1951 Refugee Convention covers.
Another crucial insight from Olsaretti’s (1998) work that has not yet been embraced by
migration scholars is the distinction between primary and secondary choices. She argues
that just because a choice is made voluntarily (or involuntarily) does not mean its sub-
sequent related decisions are necessarily voluntary or involuntary. An example is given
of a worker who might involuntarily work in an exploitative industry but might volunta-
rily choose to work for one employer over another; the voluntariness of the second-order
choice does not prescribe the voluntariness of the original choice. Relating this to
migrants, we may consider those who voluntarily leave their country of origin but then
involuntarily put themselves in the hands of smugglers because there are no acceptable
alternatives. Or, another example would be migrants who are forced to leave but then
make voluntary choices about their mode of travel (Koser 2008). Such distinctions
prove crucial because one of the main critiques of ‘forced migration’ is that all migrants
exercise agency in their decision to migrate. However, following Olsaretti (2008), migrants
exhibiting agency in their choices of how (or when or where) to migrate does not negate
the possibility that they migrated involuntarily in the first place.
Afghan and Pakistani migration
The remainder of this article draws on our longstanding empirical engagement with
Afghans and Pakistanis in Europe (specifically, the United Kingdom and Norway) (see
Erdal 2012; Erdal and Oeppen 2017; Oeppen 2013). To reiterate, we endeavour to
unpack where and how the distinction between forced and voluntary migration matters
vis-à-vis migrant experiences, scholars’ observations and labelling by immigration auth-
orities. In this section, we outline our involvement in the field and briefly comment on
the nature of Afghan and Pakistani international migration.
In the summer of 2001, as undergraduate students, we together conducted fieldwork
among Afghan refugees in New Delhi (Bivand and Oeppen 2002). Our questioning in
this article of categorising and labelling ‘forced’ and ‘voluntary’ migration was initially
contextually and temporally informed by our studies: that fieldwork and a module
called ‘The Global Refugee Regime’. The urban refugees we engaged with in Delhi,
mainly middle-class Afghans who fled Kabul after the toppling of the Soviet-backed
regime in 1992 or during the ensuing civil war, were all seeking resettlement through
UNCHR programmes. In striking contrast to media images of vulnerable fleeing
masses, these individuals showed agency and were obviously on quests for a better life
– not in India, which did not allow them to gain legal employment, but elsewhere,
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D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [U
niv
ers
ity
 of
 Su
sse
x L
ibr
ary
] a
t 0
5:5
3 2
6 O
cto
be
r 2
01
7 
notably preferring North America, Scandinavia or Australia. Talking to our research par-
ticipants about their future plans impressed upon us the need to examine migration as a
process, a cycle or a trajectory, rather than a one-off event.
Broadly speaking, Afghan migration is often labelled as forced migration and Pakistani
migration, as voluntary. These general categorisations stem from the region’s recent
history. Afghanistan has experienced war since 1979; against the Soviet Union in the
1980s, civil war in the early 1990s, followed by the Taliban regime until 2001 and the
NATO-led military presence until 2014, and on-going insecurity. The number of casual-
ties and level of displacement nationally and internationally concretely expose the high
costs of these conflicts. For Afghan populations, these tolls provide the inevitable backdrop
for the discursive use of the forced migration category and are a reminder of the undeni-
able persecution fears of many Afghans seeking asylum in Europe. Whilst the conflict
dominates discussions around Afghan migration (Harpviken 2009), it is also predated
by a historical culture of Afghan migration and mobility, largely connected to inter-
national trade networks (Marsden and Hopkins 2011).
By contrast, recent Pakistani migration has been dominated by regional male labour
migration to the Gulf States, involving both short-term contracts and longer term
migration. Pakistani migration has also included European and North American desti-
nation countries. That said, Pakistan is experiencing low-intensity conflict in several
regions, most notably in Baluchistan and, since 2009, in the northwest. This violence
along with the effects of the ‘Global War on Terror’, including drone attacks, have
taken a heavy toll on civilian populations, resulting in deaths, injuries, disabilities
and psychological harm.
The current situations in Afghanistan and Pakistan thus do not lend themselves to
a simplistic divide in which migration from one is ‘forced’ and migration from the
other, ‘voluntary’. Rather, the categories must be unpacked, analysing degrees of voli-
tion in individual cases and how forced and voluntary are constructed. In the next
section, we use a stylised migration trajectory as a framework to explore the analytical
and discursive significance of describing migration as forced and voluntary at different
stages. There are of course limitations to seeing migration as a trajectory (or cycle,
Black and Koser 1999) with identifiable stages, rather than a more fluid on-going
process. For the purposes of our analysis, however, we found it useful to break it
down into stages.
Stages of the migration process
Examining the decision to leave on a forced–voluntary continuum, we consider stages of
migration including leaving, the journey, entrance, settlement, return and remigration,
onward migration. We explore where and when differing descriptions of volition
matter for the individuals involved, as we observe them and how they themselves describe
their experiences, but also in terms of categorisation by immigration authorities. Aiming
to move beyond merely accepting that the distinction is complex, we note how and where
the distinction is more or less relevant and where there are intersections of experiences,
observations and labelling as forced or voluntary migrants.
Of course, there are plenty of Afghans in Pakistan and Iran, and migrant workers from
both Afghanistan and Pakistan find their way to the Gulf States and farther afield in Asia.
8 M. B. ERDAL AND C. OEPPEN
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Nevertheless, our fieldwork has been about migration to Europe, so we focus upon that
trajectory here.
Leaving
As reflected in our title question, ‘forced to leave?’, it is the circumstances and reasons for
leaving that unlock potential protection from the international refugee regime. This is a
fact despite migrants’3 trajectories being complex and migration reasons being likely to
evolve in the run-up to, during and after the actual decision to leave, where the degree
of volition and the alternatives available will vary, for the initial decision, as well as en
route. Reasons to leave are always compound – comprising reasons that are experienced,
observed and labelled – and result in varying analytical and discursive constructions. If a
broad interpretation of voluntariness is applied – where a lack of alternatives is the criteria
– a different discursive construction of what constitutes being ‘forced to leave’ emerges,
than if it is the 1951 Refugee Convention criteria which are applied, or indeed broader
‘humanitarian leave to remain’ definitions.
Consider, for example, Amir,4 a young Afghan going to Europe. His decision to leave,
as he experiences it, may be forced on several levels: due to the on-going conflict and inse-
curity in Afghanistan, but the decision to leave might have been taken by his parents, thus
adding to his experience of feeling forced and without alternatives.
However, because of that on-going conflict, millions of Afghans have been displaced to
neighbouring countries, particularly Pakistan and Iran. Over 35 years of conflict means
many Afghans have been born and brought up in these countries. Amir’s family lives
in Pakistan, where they experience insecurity due to discrimination and insufficient
opportunities for livelihood (Human Rights Watch 2015). Thus, at least three reasons
compel Amir to experience his leaving as forced: the conflict in Afghanistan; the decision
being taken by his parents; his immediate insecurity in Pakistan.
Meanwhile, within Pakistan, albeit on a different scale than in Afghanistan, there is dis-
placement due to insecurity, low-intensity conflicts, earthquakes and flooding. Thus, when
Parvez leaves Pakistan, his experience is that he has no alternatives, other than to leave,
due to insecurity, the misfortune of prematurely losing his father and lacking contacts
who might have helped him secure a livelihood locally.
Amir’s and Parvez’s experiences of their decisions to leave focus on lacking alternatives,
with conflict, family circumstances and livelihood opportunities playing a role. From our
point of view, their decisions to leave might be analytically constructed as forced due to
lacking alternatives. Yet, when it comes to their labelling within the international refugee
regime, there are certain distinctions between the two cases. Labelling by immigration auth-
orities in countries of asylum varies, as individual histories and experiences are scrutinised;
an assessmentmay start fromanassumption that Parvez’smigration is not forced andAmir’s
is, based on their country of origin. Another difference in the circumstances that frame their
departures is the hope of the migration being labelled ‘forced’ and so being able to apply for
and possibly obtain asylum, which Amir nourishes, whilst Parvez sees as unattainable.
The decision to leave might be more or less forced depending on how we interpret
available alternatives. Do we expect alternatives to exist at merely the level of survival,
or beyond? Analytical and discursive constructions of leaving as forced depend not just
on the experienced and observed levels of voluntariness, but also on the anticipation of
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particular labelling by immigration authorities in Europe. It is worth noting that many of
our research participants, from both Afghanistan and Pakistan, felt forced – in some sense
of the word – to leave.
The journey
For Afghans and Pakistanis able to obtain a visa, movement is relatively easy, usually
involving flying to Europe, as for the small number who comprise resettlement quotas.
For Amir and Parvez, unable to access means to travel and enter another country
legally, the journey itself becomes a dangerous, clandestine endeavour (Koser 2008).
The journey is where the differences between Afghan and Pakistani migrants are the smal-
lest. Whether the decision to leave is constructed as forced or voluntary makes little differ-
ence at this stage. For those who have no legal means to enter Europe, differences in
journey experiences are related to financial resources (and other forms of capital),
rather than whether their decision to leave was more, less or not at all forced.
Attention has increasingly turned to the journey itself, including migration brokers
and the migration ‘industry’ more broadly (Baird and van Liempt 2016; Gammeltoft-
Hansen and Sorensen 2013; Xiang and Lindquist 2014). In our encounters with
Afghans and Pakistanis, such as Amir and Parvez, we found little difference in
modes of arranging mobility through migration brokers (see also Ahmad 2013). The
business of ‘fixing’ migration enables people to obtain fake passports and visas and
to use what are essentially travel agent services that organise physical transport,
border-crossings and the circumvention of border controls. Using the services of
‘fixers’ and smugglers does not make the journey itself more or less forced by
nature – it is simply the means to enter Europe (Koser 2008). For migrants who are
trafficked, the issue of volition is to a greater extent taken out of their hands.
However, none of our research participants were the victims of trafficking, so this par-
ticular issue falls outside the scope of this article.
The journey, usually interrupted along the way, constitutes instances of mobility and
immobility (Collyer 2007; Crawley et al. 2016). Routes, like those followed by Amir and
Parvez, would run through Turkey, into southern Europe and Greece, and an extended
stay in Turkey or Greece would not be uncommon. On the Turkish side, most transit
migrants would seek to cross the border and not make efforts to regularise their status.
For the majority of migrants from Afghanistan and Pakistan, entering Europe happens
without valid entry visas, making their journeys precarious. They tend to circumvent
border controls, planning once in Europe to, as in Amir’s case, apply for asylum or, as
in the case of Parvez, who lacked clear strategies but had clear aspirations, become regu-
larised (Abdin and Erdal 2016; Carling and Collins 2017).
Migrants’ own experiences of a forced decision to leave remain significant during the
journey, being tied in with hopes for eventually applying for asylum. During the
journey, the degree of volition in the decision to leave is of little analytical significance.
From the immigration authorities’ point of view, it makes a potential difference, but
only in relation to a future asylum claim, which may or may not be filed. We see therefore
how during the journey, distinctions between forced and voluntary migration effectively
become insignificant. This underscores how immigration controls in Europe have an over-
arching effect on the discursive construction and survival of these labels. Migrants’
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assessments – of their own experiences and, equally, their chance of convincing immigra-
tion authorities of the forced nature of their decision to leave – are salient for onward
migration beyond transit. Thus demonstrated are the intersections of experienced,
observed and labelled dimensions of volition in migration decisions.
Entrance and settlement
When Amir arrived in Sweden, he applied for asylum at the local police station. Entrance
is where the distinction between those who do and do not stand a chance of being labelled
as forced matters. Amir and Parvez were both in Greece for extended periods, but for Amir
it was always a transit stay and for Parvez it became the destination. Both could seek
asylum in Greece or pursue further travel and seek asylum elsewhere in Europe. For
Amir, it was important to make sure he did not apply for asylum in Greece, in light of
the Dublin Regulation (Koser and Kuschminder 2015).
Both men’s stay in Greece was, in practice, similar. Their future prospects differed,
however; Amir believed it possible to apply for asylum in Europe, but for Parvez, this
was not relevant. Meanwhile, both felt a responsibility towards their family, wanting to
remit money to settle the debt with their migration brokers. For Parvez, a future plan
was to go to Spain, joining relatives who had regularised their status there. Parvez’s
cousin was a student in Norway, having obtained a scholarship to pursue a degree
there, which sensitised Parvez to the existence of alternative routes to entry, although
they were not accessible to him.
Thus, entrance is a relative construction. For Amir, formal entrance was in Sweden,
where he applied for asylum. For Parvez, formal entrance might never happen or might
be found in Spain in the future. In both cases, the location of existing social networks mat-
tered. For many journeying Afghans, like Amir, the stages of transit and entrance become
conflated, as there are multiple instances of ‘entering’ before the final ‘entrance’ and the
filing of an asylum claim. Here, European migration management is crucial in shaping
the migration process of individuals, often more so than whether or not the decision to
leave was experienced – or observed – as forced or voluntary (Ghosh 2000).
Settlement is regularly conflated with the stages of transit and entrance as these actions
occur repeatedly. Here, we focus on the process of settlement occurring when a destina-
tion, however it may be defined, has been reached. For Afghans who, like Amir, apply
for asylum, the first period during which the asylum claim is being processed is one of
uncertainty. The salience of state systems of evaluation of asylum claims is key to how
experiences of being ‘forced to leave’ are performed (Kea and Roberts-Holmes 2013), in
response to the understandings of persecution put forward by bureaucracies. This is a
crucial intersection of experiencing, observing and labelling decisions to migrate as
forced or not – in the outcome of an asylum claim, there is little room for debate:
asylum is either granted or not. You are either defined as a ‘forced migrant’, or you are not.
For those who get asylum, settlement in many European countries follows a fixed strat-
egy comprising language and skills-training programmes that aim to boost refugees’ finan-
cial and social self-sufficiency over time. For the rejected, regardless of their experience of a
migration decision as forced or not, return migration, onward migration and forced return
are common. That is, provided they do not ‘go underground’. For Pakistani migrants
entering southern Europe, like Parvez, few roads lead to legal residency. Instead, migrants’
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own entrepreneurship and networks prove defining of settlement processes, determining
how they find a way to earn a living and a place to stay (Ahmad 2013).
In practice, for Afghans with rejected asylum claims, strategies and experiences are
similar to those of Pakistani migrants without a regular status in Europe. The analyti-
cal construction of migrants with rejected asylum claims being ‘forced to leave’
depends not only on the actual experienced or observed volition and available alterna-
tives. To a great deal, it also depends on the interpreted legitimacy of immigration
authorities’ labelling of migrants as forced (with access to protection granted) or
not. Meanwhile, migrants, like Parvez, are more often than not analytically con-
structed as voluntary; this is a direct result of being labelled as voluntary in migration
management terms, rather than evaluating experiences and observations of available
alternatives and thus a migrant’s volition in deciding to leave. Authorities’ power to
label migrants, based on evaluations of the nature of their decision to leave,
impacts analytical and discursive constructions. Bureaucratically, the frame of what
is forced is relatively narrow and specific, leaving few descriptive shades between
black and white. It is a stark contrast to any experienced and observed realities,
which are far more nuanced.
Return or onward migration
For both Afghans and Pakistanis in Europe, the issue of return is less related to the volun-
tariness of their initial migration and more related to immigration status. With a time-
restricted student visa in Norway, Parvez’s cousin has a return for a specific date; if she
does not respect it, her status will become irregular and she risks deportation. For
Parvez, living as an irregular migrant, staying may be a question of how likely he is to
be detected and deported, but it is also a question of family matters and how well he
can cope. Many migrants do return to their origin country, at least temporarily, and
some circulate between countries over time. For Amir, who was granted asylum, return
or onward migration is a question of voluntariness, within some constraints, where the
evaluation of his initial migration as forced proves instrumental, for if his asylum claim
had been rejected he would have become deportable.
Experiences and observations of decisions to leave as more or less forced are relatively
insignificant in the face of immigration authorities’ return policies. For them, it is the
evaluation of someone’s decision to leave as forced, deemed valid according to set criteria,
which makes a difference. However, analytical and discursive constructions as forced and
voluntary may have an effect on public sympathy and support, as seen, for example, in
anti-deportation campaigns (Gibney 2013).
On the whole, migrants like Parvez and his cousin would not be discursively con-
structed as deserving of public sympathy in the face of deportation. Meanwhile, migrants
from Afghanistan, with its well-known insecurity, would likelier be seen as victims of
incorrect evaluations concerning whether or not migration was forced. The distinction
between forced or voluntary decisions to leave in the first place thus sticks throughout
the asylum-determination process, and has a great impact on Afghans with rejected
claims. Europe has also seen a rise in Pakistanis who file asylum claims, which frequently
get rejected and lead to deportations, or who are intercepted as irregular migrants and
become subjected to deportation.
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Migration is neither a linear process nor, necessarily, a circular one (Harpviken 2014).
Among those with refugee status in Europe or, more broadly, third-country nationals
acquiring European citizenships, onward migration within Europe as well as to North
America is relatively common. Amir contemplated the idea of one day joining relatives
in California.
Meanwhile, onward migration regularly occurs among those without legal documents,
sometimes seeking opportunities of legality. We see this among Pakistani migrants
moving towards Spain or Afghans moving to Italy and applying for asylum there to
access mobility within the rest of the Schengen Area.
For those migrants deported from European countries back to Afghanistan or Pakistan,
onward migration might essentially be remigration to Europe. Often this involves
migration between Afghanistan and Iran or Pakistan whilst preparing for remigration
to destinations further afield (Majidi 2009). Among Pakistani migrants who are forcibly
returned to Pakistan, remigration to Europe as well as labour migration to the Gulf
States is common (Koser and Kuschminder 2015).
It is worth noting, too, that what might start as a voluntary migration could involve
forced onward migration, or vice versa. For example, West African migrants arriving in
Europe, having been forced to leave Libya in recent years, where their initial migration
was more voluntary, but their secondary migration was shaped by the conflict in Libya.
In such cases, the importance of countries of origin and nationality may be over-empha-
sised in labelling migrants as forced or voluntary, particularly for refugee status
determination.
Conclusion
Embarking on this article, we stated that it is not enough to point out the complexity of the
forced-voluntary continuum. Whilst many academics have rightly noted that defining an
individual as a forced or a voluntary migrant is highly problematic (Castles, De Haas, and
Miller 2014; DeWind 2007; Fussell 2012) – and even more so when describing migrant
flows en masse – the distinction sticks in academic work and public discourse. Following
Bakewell (2011) and Zetter (1991, 2007), we believe that semantics are relevant to con-
sider, as are considerations of who is doing the labelling and what the discursive work
of those labels entails. There are also important distinctions between self-identification
and imposed labels; an analytical description of an individual’s migration decisions
along a forced-voluntary continuum is necessarily more reflective of the complexity of
individual experiences, agency and contextual circumstances than a binary labelling of
forced or not. Yet, analytical descriptions of the processes of migration decisions are
part of a broader landscape, within which we must acknowledge that discursive construc-
tions of migration, and the labels attached to them, carry a ‘normative weight’. How a
migrant is labelled may have significant implications on treatment from receiving states
(see Ottonelli and Torresi 2013).
An analytical understanding indicates that by applying criteria of voluntariness and avail-
able alternatives, many migration decisions are not seen as entirely voluntary. A discursive
construction of ‘the migrant’ or ‘the refugee’ veers away from the complexity of reality and
reifies the binary of forced vs. voluntary; it turns it into two boxes between which migrant
experience necessarily can and must be divided. The discursive significance of describing
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migration as forced or voluntarymatters to states, as to whether or not individuals are seen as
legitimate asylum seekers, with the right to international protection. Analytically, the salience
of describingmigration as forced and voluntary lies in the intellectual pursuit of better under-
standing the role of volition in migration decisions, under differing conditions. In analytical
terms, resisting the dichotomyof forced vs. voluntary,which largely sticks formigrationman-
agement reasons, should lead neither to using the nebulous ‘mixed migration’ term nor
accepting the discursively constructed binary of ‘forced’ and ‘voluntary’.
A state may have legitimate reasons for approaching border control, migration manage-
ment and humanitarian protection as it does, and these may stray from an individual
migrant’s perspective. Forced and voluntary migration is also a distinction made by
migrants themselves, whereby someone fleeing a violent conflict may be recognised by
other migrants as having no choice. Despite feeling they had no other acceptable alterna-
tives, but to migrate in pursuit of a life that could be lived, some migrants may effectively
have had more of a choice. And here the significance of how migration is described
returns: whether a migrant is labelled as forced or voluntary within an immigration
system majorly impacts their access to protection.
We readily recognise that many migrants forced to flee the conflict in Afghanistan have
legitimate needs for protection. We also acknowledge the unsettling idea that questioning
migration categories may contribute to destabilising an already eroded refugee regime in
Europe (Koser and Martin 2011). Yet, the discursive and analytical implications of
describing migration as forced and voluntary need to be scrutinised. There must be
better ways of safeguarding needs for protection than the world currently offers. One
course of action might be for scholars to challenge the status quo more, not only by decon-
structing government labelling, but also by further unpacking the assumed dichotomy
between forced and voluntary migration, thereby examining voluntariness.
As Ottonelli and Torresi (2013) caution, discussions of the forced–voluntary migration
continuum risk becoming circular if policy hinges on particular interpretations of volition
in migration, whilst scholarly approaches to volition are also built on those very policy
definitions. We therefore support the stance that ‘[i]f other principles than the recognition
of migrants’ agency must come into play, they need to do it openly, rather than under the
guise of an unorthodox and inconsistent notion of voluntariness’ (Ottonelli and Torresi
2013, 810).
The purpose of describing migrants as forced and voluntary analytically and discur-
sively is different in intent, but it is also different according to scale. In migrants’ experi-
ences as well as scholars’ qualitative, field-based observations, the analytical unit is often
the individual or family. For the state, whilst protection is determined individually, the
scale of the analytical unit is that of groups: be it of refugees from particular conflict
areas or another mass of people feeding into the broader category of ‘immigrants’.
States’ migration management efforts are not individual-level; they target collectively.
Thus there is a discrepancy in the scales to which attention is being paid reflective of
the primary interests of different actors: of controlling populations on the part of states;
of finding safety and quality of life, on the part of migrants; and for scholars, analytically
trying to understand what is going on and why.
The use of ‘mixed migration’ makes us, like many others who study migration, uncom-
fortable. What we see empirically is that people migrate from both Afghanistan and Paki-
stan for a diverse set of reasons. Different degrees of volition are involved, and in many
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cases across both countries no acceptable alternatives to migration can be found. If
emphasising that mix means that migrants in need of protection are less likely to
receive it, or must go through multiple stages of ‘proving’ that they need it, then empha-
sising the fluidity of the forced–voluntary continuum can have negative implications for
our research participants (Bakewell 2011, 15).
However, as migration scholars we have an obligation to move beyond a statement
acknowledging complexity. We must dare to grasp what has so far been analytically diffi-
cult, even if that means destabilising the fragile and dysfunctional refugee regime. The
current need for humanitarian assistance and relief to people fleeing violent conflict in
Europe’s neighbouring areas is obvious. Meanwhile, enormous resources are invested in
seeking to control Europe’s borders, to limited avail. Yet, asking the obvious question –
what if border control was not the primary focus, but rather the lives of those in desperate
humanitarian circumstances? – is not politically permissible in the public debate in Euro-
pean countries.
Whilst states may have particular priorities relating to control and management, scho-
lars of migration should be free to choose which perspectives are best to apply. A state-
centred analysis is arguably no more valid, reasonable or scientific than one emphasising
the experiences of migrants who are differently placed along the forced–voluntary conti-
nuum. Some are in need of protection; all are in search of a future in which life may be
lived.
Notes
1. For a key discussion in this debate, see Hathaway (2007) and responses to that article in the
same issue of the Journal of Refugee Studies.
2. For a similar discussion relating Nozick’s ideas to the notion of voluntary repatriation, see
Long (2013).
3. For ease of expression, in this section we use ‘migrant’ as an umbrella term to describe people
moving (including refugees and others labelled as forced migrants).
4. Names used are pseudonyms, which were created for compound characters. We collated
details of migration trajectories from several individuals in order to present ‘typical’
examples, where the point is not any one individual’s story, but the fact that such trajectories
are shared by many migrants. We chose to focus more on young male examples, reflective of
current migration flows to Europe from Afghanistan and Pakistan.
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